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SYMPOSIUM:
100 YEARS OF STANDARD OIL
ANTITRUST ENERGY
BARAK ORBACH*
D. DANIEL SOKOL
I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law has been declared a failure, moribund, or possibly just a
ghost from the trustbusting era. A quarter of a century ago, Thomas Hazlett
declared: "Any responsible historian of American antitrust policy must
conclude that, if one takes at face value the assertions that antitrust laws
exist to advance competition and protect the consumer, that policy is a
failure. The notorious Berkey Photo case may be the flagship of that failed
policy."' Hazlett went as far as suggesting it would be "most
effective ... to consider federal enforcement of the antitrust laws to be a
per se restraint of trade."2 Robert Crandall and Clifford Winston examined
the question: "Should the United States pursue a vigorous antitrust
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. We are grateful to
the Competition Law Center at George Washington University Law School for sponsoring the 100
Years of Standard Oil Symposium.
1. Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Antitrust Anticompetitive?, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 277, 334
(1986) (footnote omitted) (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980)).
2. Id. at 336.
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policy?"' They found "little empirical evidence that past interventions have
provided much direct benefit to consumers or significantly deterred
anticompetitive behavior."4 Other scholars examined whether antitrust was
still alive.5 Yet, recently some stressed that antitrust is not dead, but while
"at one time [it] was skewed toward over-enforcement, . . . today if there is
any bias it is in the opposite direction."6 Statistical figures indicate that,
since the 1970s, the volume of civil antitrust litigation is low compared to
prior decades.7 For these reasons and others, Jonathan Baker tried to
provide "evidence of the necessity and success of antitrust enforcement."'
The Supreme Court, however, voiced skepticism about antitrust litigation.9
In the fall of 2007, Antitrust therefore posed the question for a special
issue: The End ofAntitrust As We Know It?'o
Marking the centennial anniversary of Standard Oil Co. v. United
States," we argue that much of the critique of antitrust enforcement and the
skepticism about its social significance suffer from "Nirvana fallacy"-
comparing existing and feasible policies to ideal normative policies, and
concluding that the existing and feasible ones are inherently inefficient
because of their imperfections.12 Antitrust law and policy have always been
3. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare?
Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2003).
4. Id. at 4.
5. See, e.g., THE CONFERENCE BD., RESEARCH REPORT NO. 928, Is ANTITRUST DEAD? (1989).
6. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 685, 701 (2009). See also HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 3 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) [hereinafter
How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK).
7. During this period, the volume of criminal antitrust cases has been much higher than in any
other era. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 36 (2d. ed. 2001); Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in
Antitrust Laws, Economics and Enforcement, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 733, 733, 746-47 (2011).
For the role of treble damages in this trend, see D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and
Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (2012).
8. Jonathan B. Baker, The Casefor Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27,27 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007); William H. Page,
Twombly and Communication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted Action Under the New Pleading
Standards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 439 (2009); D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance
and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201, 235 (forthcoming
2012) ("[B]oth plaintiff- and defense-side respondents noted a change in the ability to bring private
actions in recent years. Some argued that Twombly caused the elimination of the most unreasonable
cartel claims. For a number of practitioners, the impact of Twombly has been significant in terms of
reducing weak cases. However, other respondents asserted that Twombly's impact was minimal because
most of the cases filed would have survived Twombly."); Mark D. Whitener, Editor's Note: The End of
Antitrust?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 5, 5.
10. ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at cover page. See also Whitener, supra note 9, at 5-6.
11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. See generally Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1-4 (1969).
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and will always be imperfect. However, they are alive and kicking. The
antitrust discipline is vibrant, evolving, and global.13 This Essay introduces
a number of important innovations in scholarship related to Standard Oil
and its modem applications and identifies shifts in antitrust that will keep
the field energized for some time to come.
Writing for the Court in Standard Oil, Chief Justice White expressed
the view that Congress passed the Sherman Act because of "the dread of
enhancement of prices."' 4 Berkey Photo, the alleged flagship of the failed
antitrust policy, stands among other things for the proposition that
"[s]etting a high price may be a use of monopoly power, but it is not in
itself anticompetitive."' 5 The transition between these statements was
meaningful. The Berkey Photo court unequivocally stated a well-
established economic understanding-high prices are not necessarily
uncompetitive.' 6 Like economic thinking, although perhaps at a slower
pace, antitrust evolves.
William Howard Taft, who was President of the United States at the
time the Supreme Court handed down the Standard Oil decision, described
Standard Oil as "the greatest monopoly and combination in restraint of
trade in the world[,] ... an octopus that held the trade in its tentacles, and
the few actual independent concerns that kept alive were allowed to exist
by sufferance merely to maintain an appearance of competition."17
Standard Oil invented the "corporate trust" and played a central role in the
trust movement that motivated Congress to enact the Sherman Act in
1890.18 More than 130 years after Standard Oil took over almost the entire
market for refining of crude oil in the United States, scholars still debate
how the company acquired its monopolistic position.19
Standard Oil's pricing schemes symbolize traditional and
13. Sokol, supra note 7; D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law,
109 MICH. L. REv. 1029, 1041-48 (2011); D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and
Improving Antitrust Agency Capacity, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081 (2009).
14. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
15. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17. wLLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 85-86 (1914).
18. See generally Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85
S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Daniel Crane, Were Standard Oil's Rebates and Drawbacks Cost Justified?, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 559 (2012); Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by "Raising Rivals'
Costs": The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. I (1996); Benjamin Klein, The "Hub-and-Spoke"
Conspiracy that Created the Standard Oil Monopoly, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 459 (2012); George L. Priest,
Rethinking the Economic Basis of the Standard Oil Refining Monopoly: Dominance Against Competing
Cartels, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 499 (2012).
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contemporary controversies over potential anticompetitive effects of
discounts.20 Standard Oil is iconic because it was the first time antitrust
was used to break up a company, and at the time Standard Oil was the
largest company in the United States. Structural remedies and choice of
remedies have remained controversial ever since. 21
Standard Oil was involved in numerous legal battles before its
dissolution. The lawsuits against Standard Oil illustrate the roles of private
and public plaintiffs in Section 2 claims, as well as strategic conduct of
such plaintiffs.22 Contemporary plaintiffs in actions against Microsoft,
Intel, Google, and other giants utilize similar strategies and leverage the
globalization of competition laws.23
Standard Oil is the case in which the Supreme Court embraced
reading a reasonableness qualification into the interpretation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act: the rule of reason. 24 For that alone, Standard Oil is one of
the most significant cases in antitrust jurisprudence. The Supreme Court
probably would have endorsed the rule of reason even without Standard
Oil,25 and today's rule of reason is rather different from Standard Oil's rule
of reason.26 However, it was still Standard Oil that formally contributed the
rule of reason to antitrust jurisprudence. By today's standards, the factual
and economic analyses of the Standard Oil Court were crude and imprecise
in several ways.27 Yet, the decision should be judged by the standards of
1911. In retrospect, popular market theories that had been used to criticize
antitrust policy were simplistic and socially costly.28 Today's petroleum
markets are very different from the markets Standard dominated, but
20. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist History of Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL.
L. REv. 573 (2012); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J) Case, I J.L. &
ECON. 137 (1958).
21. See Peter C. Carstensen, Remedies for Monopolization From Standard Oil to Microsoft and
Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law From Elimination of Market Power to Regulation of Its
Use, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 815 (2012).
22. See Sokol, supra note 7.
23. Id.
24. See Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil as Lochner's Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 783-84
(2012); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of
Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 733 (2012).
25. See infra Section II.B; Meese, supra note 24, at 787-93.
26. See Gavil, supra note 24.
27. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 19; Leslie, supra note 23; William H. Page, Standard Oil and
U.S. Steel: Predation and Collusion in the Law of Monopolization and Mergers, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 657
(2012).
28. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2011).
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antitrust remains essential in those markets. 29 Business history shows that
antitrust is and has always been needed.30
The rise of Standard Oil contributed to the birth of antitrust. The
breakup of Standard Oil released enough energy to fuel discussions and
disagreements a century later.3 ' Despite a somewhat popular (at least
outside of the field of antitrust) narrative of the death of antitrust, this
Essay introduces several areas of "energy" in antitrust through works
authored for the centennial anniversary of Standard Oil.
II. ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
A. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE GOALS
Writing for the Court in Standard Oil, Chief Justice White argued that
"it may be with accuracy said that the dread of enhancement of prices and
of other wrongs which it was thought would flow from the undue limitation
on competitive conditions ... led . .. to the prohibition [of] all contracts or
acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions."32 That
is, Chief Justice White believed that the goals of antitrust could be defined
precisely. One hundred years later, the goals of antitrust law are still
defined with clarity: protection of consumer welfare. Both definitions are
vague and undesirable from the economic perspective.
Chief Justice White's focus on the "dread of enhancement of prices"
supposedly suggests that a successful firm could violate antitrust laws only
for the capacity to increase prices. In essence, this principle means no-fault
liability for monopolists. 33
The modem stated goal of antitrust laws supposedly reflects the
29. Timothy J. Muris & Bilal K. Sayyed, The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum,
and Politics at the Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 843 (2012).
30. Margaret C. Levenstein, Antitrust and Business History, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 451 (2012).
31. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 45 (2000) ("In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the Supreme
Court directly tackled the question of dominant firm conduct and left four enduring marks. First, the
Court treated Standard's 90 percent share of refinery output as proof of monopoly. Future cases
commonly would use high market shares as proxies for monopoly power. Second, the Court established
the "rule of reason" as the basic method of antitrust analysis.... Third, the Court began classifying
some behavior as unreasonably exclusionary... .Finally, despite Standard's dire (and unfulfilled)
predictions of industrial apocalypse, the Court broke the firm into 34 parts." (citation omitted)).
32. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
33. See Orbach & Campbell Rebling, supra note 18.
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legislative intent of the Sherman Act.34 In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the
Supreme Court quoted Robert Bork's argument that Congress passed the
Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription."35 Perhaps the only
thing that "may be said with accuracy" is that, since then, courts have been
treating the protection of consumer welfare as the goal of antitrust law.
Nevertheless, lawyers and economists do not know or agree about the
meaning of the term "consumer welfare" in antitrust, although it has a
defined meaning in economics. 36
In The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, Barak Orbach and Grace Campbell
Rebling point out that Robert Bork introduced his definition in response to
antitrust policies that were size oriented and protected small businesses.
They note that Bork reconstructed antitrust history to argue that Congress
passed the Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription."
In Standard Oil as Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan Meese addresses
one aspect of the present controversy over the meaning of the term
"consumer welfare."" Meese points out that courts are inconsistent with
the application of the term. For the purpose of Section 2, courts tend to
embrace interpretations that appear to be related to the "total surplus"
standard. Under Section 1, because of the rule of reason that Chief Justice
White introduced in Standard Oil, courts endorse interpretations that focus
on consumer interests. Meese goes further and argues that "courts have
apparently structured the Rule of Reason analysis in a manner that equates
'consumer welfare' with the welfare of purchasers in the relevant
market."" Meese argues that the modern "consumer welfare" goal should
be interpreted in the spirit of Chief Justice White's Lochnerian idea of the
rule of reason.39 Such interpretation may be closer to the total surplus
standard. One concern that comes to mind is that if we defer to the view of
Chief Justice White in Standard Oil in searching for the goals of antitrust
34. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
EcoN. 7, 11 (1966) ("[T]he legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act was that courts should be
guided exclusively by consumer welfare. . . ."). But see Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer
Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 134 (2011) (critiquing Bork's misuse of the term
"consumer welfare").
35. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 66 (1978)). See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare, and
Antitrust Law, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 449 (2008).
36. E.g., Orbach, supra note 34, at 133-34.
37. Meese, supra note 24, at 119-30.
38. Id. at 121. In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007), the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between buyers and sellers in contexts where the
buyers hold the market power.
39. Meese, supra note 24, at 130-31.
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laws, we may end up with the focus on "dread of enhancement of prices
and of other wrongs."
Since Standard Oil considerable energy has been spent on the
discussion of the goals of antitrust laws. And commentators still find
energy to debate the topic. 40 Considering the frequent use of the term
"consumer welfare" in antitrust, this topic may be one of the most
important unsettled areas.
B. THE RULE OF REASON
In Standard Oil, Chief Justice White declared that courts should use
the rule of reason to construe the Sherman Act: The "standard of reason
which had been applied at the common law" should guide interpretation of
the phrase "restraint of trade" in Section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 1 In adding
a reasonableness qualification to the ban on "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce," 42 Chief Justice White closed a circle. In 1897, fourteen years
earlier, the Supreme Court rejected his approach in a five-to-four decision
in Trans-Missouri Freight Ass 'n. 3 Justice Peckham wrote the decision for
the Court, declaring that the inquiry into whether a restraint of trade was
reasonable or unreasonable was unimportant because the Sherman Act
denounced all restraints." Justice White wrote the dissent and argued that
"a brief consideration of the history and development of the law on the
subject will . . . demonstrate that the words 'restraint of trade' embrace
only contracts which unreasonably restrain trade, and, therefore, that
reasonable contracts, although they, in some measure, 'restrain trade,' are
40. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in
Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 3 (2006); Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis:
Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 29 (2006); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice
and Consumer Welfare in Antitrust (forthcoming); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The
Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 191 (2008); Orbach, supra note 37; Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper
Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 336 (2010); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551 (2012).
41. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
42. Id. at 49.
43. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
44. Id. at 327-28 ("Contracts in restraint of trade have been known and spoken of for hundreds
of years .... When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in
restraint of trade or commerce . . ., the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to
that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in
such language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has
been omitted by Congress.").
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not within the meaning of the words."45
Two weeks after delivering the Standard Oil decision, Chief Justice
White delivered another important antitrust decision. In United States v.
American Tobacco Co. ,46 Chief Justice White clarified his view of the
reasonableness qualification:
[I]n the Standard Oil Case [it was held] that, giving to the [Sherman Act]
a reasonable construction, the words :restraint of trade" did not embrace
all those normal and usual contracts essential to individual freedom and
the right to make which were necessary in order that the course of trade
might be free.47
Justice Peckham, who rejected the reasonableness qualification in
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass 'n, was inconsistent in applying his own strict
interpretation of Section 1. Already in Trans-Missouri he identified a
category of contracts that should be excluded from the coverage of Section
1.48 Similarly, in Joint-Traffic Ass'n, Justice Peckham reiterated the
rejection of the reasonableness qualification, but exempted from the
Sherman Act restraints of trade he described as "incidental" or "indirect." 49
In Standard Oil as Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan Meese argues that
"Standard Oil was simply an application of Lochner to antitrust policy."50
He reasons that "[a]n unduly broad reading of the statute, then, would
infringe the liberty of contract that Lochner and its progeny so jealously
protected." 5' Meese points out that today's rule of reason serves as a device
to narrow, or "define," the Sherman Act's coverage "so as not to ban
contracts and other conduct protected by the due process clause, but instead
to reach only those contracts and conduct susceptible to regulation under
Lochner's regulatory paradigm."52 He, thus, concludes that "one of
constitutional law's most maligned decisions [Lochner] and its progeny
live on, at least nominally [through the rule of reason], with no sign of
mortality."53
45. Id at 346.
46. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
47. Id. at 180-81.
48. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 329 (1897) ("A contract which
is the mere accompaniment of the sale of property, and thus entered into for the purpose of enhancing
the price at which the vendor sells it, which in effect is collateral to such sale, and where the main
purpose of the whole contract is accomplished by such sale, might not be included within the letter or
spirit of the statute in question.")
49. United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898).
50. Meese, supra note 24, at 784 (referring to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Justice Peckham, who rejected the application of the rule of reason in
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass', authored Lochner. Meese stresses Justice
Peckham's approach to the liberty of contract, as reflected in Lochner and
other decisions, including his antitrust decisions. The endorsement of the
rule of reason in Standard Oil reflects the general sentiments of the Court
as expressed in Lochner.54
Lochner and Standard Oil are landmark cases in which the Supreme
Court created rules that narrowed the power of the state to interfere with
the liberty of contract. However, there is at least one significant distinction
between the Lochner jurisprudence and the antitrust restraint of trade
jurisprudence. Lochner is about Section 1 of the New York Bakeshop Act
that intervened in employment agreements for paternalistic concerns to one
of the parties to the agreement. The antitrust restraint of trade jurisprudence
is mostly about harm to others that restraint of trade (the agreement) may
cause. As such, the antitrust restraint of trade jurisprudence seems more
like an ordinary application of the police powers at turns of the century.55
The incorporation of the reasonableness qualification in Standard Oil
ended one debate over the proper application of antitrust laws, 56 but
marked only the beginning of many other debates and controversies. More
than a century later, courts, lawyers, and scholars still have energy to
criticize the antitrust rule of reason and debate its scope and meaning of its
application. In his article, Moving Beyond Caricature and
Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, Andrew Gavil
evaluates the level of uncertainty under the modern rule of reason one
hundred years after the Supreme Court delivered its Standard Oil
decision.5 7 He chronicles the historical journey of the rule of reason from
an undefined reasonableness qualification to the ban on restraints of trade
to a structured approach that relies on economic analysis." Gavil further
illustrates how judicial misunderstanding of the evolution of the rule of
reason impedes its progression and adds uncertainty to the application of
antitrust laws.
Gavil's analysis of the evolution of the rule of reason also stresses the
methodological transition in antitrust analysis. Chief Justice White's view
54. Id. at 792-96.
55. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1876); ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER
(1904); W.P. PRENTICE, POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER THE LAW OF OVERRULING NECESSITY
(1894).
56. See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 360-64 (1904) (Brewer J., concurring).
57. Gavil, supra note 24.
58. Id. at 740-83.
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that antitrust laws had something to do with "the dread of enhancement of
prices"59 was an intuitive approach that was grounded in economic
analysis. Today, economics guides antitrust policy. 60
A few weeks after the Supreme Court handed down its Standard Oil
decision, it delivered another landmark antitrust decision: Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.61 In Dr. Miles, adopting a certain
liberty of contract theory,62 the Supreme Court announced that resale price
maintenance (RPM) was illegal per se. It took the Court ninety-six years to
overrule Dr. Miles. In 2007, in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court delivered a five-to-four landmark decision
holding that RPM agreements should be assessed under the rule of
reason.63 Three years later, in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League, the Supreme Court took a look into the contractual arrangements
of sports leagues and pointed out that when the NFL's contractual activities
for its teams with third parties may violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act
they should be judged under the rule of reason.' The Court rejected the
contractual theory that the NFL and its teams are a "single economic
enterprise." 65 Both decisions left industries and antitrust practitioners with
some uncertainty about how courts would apply the rule of reason.
In some respects, Dr. Miles may be antitrust's Lochner: A
controversial decision that was adopted on some theory of liberty of
contract, which the Supreme Court did not apply coherently, 66 ultimately
abandoned, and that probably will remain controversial. The rule of reason
was a concept present in antitrust before Standard Oil, but it was officially
embraced by Chief Justice White in Standard Oil. As such, Standard Oil
contributed to the jurisprudence of reasoning in antitrust but left the field
with unsolved uncertainties, and energized debates over many doctrinal and
economic theories.
59. See supra note 32.
60. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 43, 58-59.
61. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
62. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 383, 408-09 ("But, because there is monopoly of production, it
certainly cannot be said that there is no public interest in maintaining freedom of trade with respect to
future sales after the article has been placed on the market and the producer has parted with his title.
Moreover, every manufacturer, before sale, controls the articles he makes."). See generally Barak Y.
Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 261 (2008); Barak Y.
Orbach, The lmage Theory: RPM and the Allure of High Prices, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 277 (2010).
63. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
64. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
65. Id. at 2213-16.
66. Under the Colgate doctrine, manufacturers could for the most part circumvent the ban on
RPM at the federal level. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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C. OUTSIZED CONCERNS ABOUT SIZE
In The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, Orbach and Campbell Rebling
argue that, as sophisticated as modem antitrust may be, fears of size still
influence and burden applications of the law.67 The inertia of fears of size
seems to be embedded in antitrust. Some antitrust scholars and practitioners
still believe that absolute size should be a legal concern. At the very least,
such views generate costs to large firms and confuse public opinions.
Relative size-market share-is a basic analytical instrument in antitrust. It
supposedly suggests that when a firm's relative size grows, its market
power correspondingly increases. This proposition may hold in very
limited circumstances. 68  At present, although most understand the
limitations of the reliance on market share analysis and the Merger
Guidelines reflect such understanding, the use of market shares in antitrust
law is still rigid. Size perceptions influence the operation of antitrust law-
concerns regarding absolute size play a role in antirust jurisprudence and
relative size is still dominant in antitrust analysis. The American antitrust
discipline might owe its birth to the fear of size, but thus far it has not
acquired enough energy to recover from this fear.69
D. IDEOLOGICAL DISTORTIONS AND OTHER BIASES
Antitrust has greatly evolved since Standard Oil. The evolution of
antitrust has been shaped by changing lines of economic thinking and
ideologies. 70 Robert Bork identified the influence of "[a]nti free-market
forces"7' and a "socialist drive." 72 Others identified conservative ideology
in Bork's influential antitrust writing. Many also attribute a conservative
political ideology to the influential Chicago School of Antitrust.73 Richard
67. Orbach & Campbell Rebling, supra note 18.
68. Id.; Barak Y. Orbach, The Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets,
21 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (2004).
69. Orbach & Campbell Rebling, supra note 18.
70. See, e.g., RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: 1888-1992 (1996);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105
(1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955 (Jan. 2009),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article-1002&context-herbert-hovenkamp.
71. Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138,
138.
72. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX xiii (rev. ed. 1993).
73. See, e.g., HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 6; Michael S.
Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv. 219 (1995);
William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 49
(1991).
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Posner, however, suggested that the differences between the Chicago
School and other economic perspectives to antitrust are "totally
nonideological." 74 It may be fair to state that ideological distortions are
particularly noticeable when a person disagrees with the ideology.75
Members of the Chicago School exemplified this maxim in a festive
symposium: The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at
Chicago, 1932-1970.76
Standard Oil also symbolizes concerns regarding ideological
distortions and other biases in antitrust. In Revisiting the Revisionist
History ofStandard Oil, Christopher Leslie illustrates this point.
The Standard Oil Court held that the company engaged in predatory
pricing. The iconic status of the decision drew significant attention to this
element as well: for several decades courts used Standard Oil as an
authoritative reference on predatory pricing.78 In the late 1950s, John
McGee, a first-generation economist of the Chicago School, examined the
trial record of Standard Oil to determine whether the company engaged in
predatory pricing. In 1958, he published his findings in an article that
became a very influential work on predatory pricing.79 McGee concluded
that "Standard [Oil] did not systematically, if ever, use local price
cutting .. . to reduce competition. To do so would have been foolish."o8 He
therefore argued that "if the popular interpretation of the Standard Oil case
is at all responsible for the emphasis that anti-trust policy places on 'unfair'
and 'monopolizing' business practices, that emphasis is misplaced."81
McGee's critique of Standard Oil influenced the case law and scholarly
approach to predatory pricing. Many have used his article as a reference to
suggest that predatory pricing does not exist or is rare.82
In Revisiting the Revisionist History of Standard Oil, Christopher
Leslie debunks McGee. Leslie examines John McGee's study of Standard
Oil and argues that it does not support McGee's factual claims, theoretical
74. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925
(1979).
75. See Barak Orbach, On Hubris, Civility, and Incivility, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 443 (2012).
76. Symposium, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-
1970,26 J.L. & EcoN. 163 (Edmund W. Kitch ed., 1983).
77. Leslie, supra note 20.
78. Id. at 573.
79. John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case, I J.L. & ECON. 137
(1958).
80. Id. at 168.
81. Id. at 169.
82. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 20.
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arguments, and conclusions." Specifically, Leslie concludes that "even if
the facts of Standard Oil do not prove that the oil company engaged in
predatory pricing, the record in that case cannot stand as proof that
predatory pricing does not occur or that it fails when attempted."84 Leslie's
critique of McGee's study of predatory pricing is in essence a critique of
the ideologies and beliefs in antitrust.
In many ways, Leslie's critique of McGee is conceptually parallel to
McGee's critique of Standard Oil. McGee argues that all conclusions
related to Standard Oil's alleged predatory pricing, including antitrust
policies that relied on the Standard Oil precedent, were "logically
deficient."" Leslie argues that McGee's analysis is "logically flawed,"86
builds on a "logical fallacy,"87  and "risks distorting antitrust
jurisprudence."" As such, McGee and Leslie share the belief that
extrapolation of normative arguments from unfounded factual frameworks
should not influence antitrust policy. Leslie adds that McGee failed with
the same logical deficiency he attributed to others: overclaiming.89
In 1981, Frank Easterbrook argued that "there is no sufficient reason
for antitrust law or the courts to take [predatory pricing] seriously."90 It
may well be that many still subscribe to this view.91 The debate, however,
shifted toward the legal definition of predatory pricing and the standard of
proof for predation. 92 Predatory pricing is yet another unsettled antitrust
topic that Standard Oil fueled.
Some of the unsettled controversies in antitrust, as the parallel lines of
arguments of McGee and Leslie illustrate, stem from biases, overclaiming,
and the habit of relying on certain references. No matter how much energy
one has, the fire of truth does not exist.93
83. Id See also James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A
Re-Examination of the Trial Record, 22 RES. LAW & ECON. 155 (2007).
84. Leslie, supra note 20, at 602.
85. McGee, supra note 79, at 138.
86. Leslie, supra note 20, at 579.
87. Id. at 589.
88. Id. at 603.
89. Id. at 579.
90. Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
264 (1981).
91. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE? (1999); Kenneth
G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, 89 GEO. L.J. 2475 (2001).
92. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2005).
93. For the social costs of uncompromising positions see Barak Y. Orbach & Frances R. Sjoberg,
Excessive Speech, Civility Norms, and the Clucking Theorem, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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III. MARKET STRUCTURE AND REMEDIES
A. MARKET DEFINITION
John D. Rockefeller took control over almost the entire market for
refining of crude oil in the United States. Controversies still exist as to how
he did that.94 The Standard Oil Court, however, did not use the word
"market" even once, but the concept of "market" has guided antitrust
thinking thus far. "Market definition" has been a core element in structural
antitrust analysis.95 The significance of the antitrust utilization of the term
"market" cannot be overstated. Antitrust drove many, if not most, of the
methodological developments in definition and understanding of the term.
Antitrust critics, who believe that free markets function well without
antitrust enforcement, could not have conceptualized the "markets" in
which they believe without methodological contributions driven by
antitrust enforcement. 96 To a large extent, the modem understanding of
markets relies on traditional tools developed for antitrust analysis.
Market definition is also one of the areas that stresses the myopia of
the requiem for antitrust. The use of these concepts in antitrust analysis has
defined their use and perception in all other areas. The concept of "market"
in antitrust analysis is at the verge of methodological transformation. For
quite some time, economists have been developing and experimenting with
alternative methodologies that would relax the reliance on market analysis
and could be used in legal institutions. Once established in antitrust, the
applications of these methodologies to other legal fields and thinking of
markets in general may be vast.
Traditional market definition methodologies are not helpful in many
instances. Simulation models introduced several challenges, but generally
they could not withstand scrutiny in court. The 2010 Merger Guidelines
relax the reliance on market definition by adopting the upward pricing
pressure ("UPP") test for analyzing unilateral competitive effects of
horizontal mergers on differentiated products.97
94. See Granitz & Klein, supra note 19; Klein supra note 19; Priest, supra note 19.
95. See generally Dennis W. Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y
INT'L 1 (2007); Gregory J. Werden, The History ofAntitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REv. 123
(1992).
96. See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281
(1956).
97. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 2.1.3,
6.1. (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES].
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Merger analysis is the first area of attack against market definition.
Reliance on market definition has been under fire from a number of
different directions. One is the increased use of simulation models in
differentiated product markets that has not advanced sufficiently. Two
additional and relatively new methodologies are now in use: Compensating
Marginal-Cost Reductions (CMCRs), which look at prices, quantities and
demand elasticities,98 and Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP), which measures
the "strength of the merged firm's incentive to increase price above pre-
merger levels."99
Other attacks on market definition have come from professorsoo while
yet a further set of attacks are based on changes within recent Horizontal
Merger Guidelines that seem to embrace UPP.'t In the merger context, the
lessening importance of market definition will play out in the courts in
interesting ways, as the courts seem to hold with some level of suspicion
the abandonment of the market definition.10 2 Yet, if courts over time
embrace the current 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines as they did the
1992 Merger Guidelines,o 3 this may have profound effects across antitrust.
The changes in the understanding of market definition with regard to
merger law will ultimately impact how courts view issues of market
definition in monopolization cases.
B. MONOPOLIZATION
Enforcement regimes in antitrust law change, but the role of dominant
firms in antitrust continues to be hotly debated. In this sense, Standard Oil
has been a preview to the present and future, not merely a blip in antitrust's
past.'04 D. Daniel Sokol shows that the strategic use of private and public
litigation against Standard Oil share the general characteristics of
98. Greg Werden, Luke M. Froeb & Steven Tschantz, The Effects of Merger Efficiencies on
Consumers of Differentiated Products, 1 EUR. COMPETITION J. 245, 255 (2005).
99. Elizabeth M. Bailey et al, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus
"Upward Pricing Pressure, " ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2010, at 1, 1. See also Joseph Farrell & Carl
Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10
B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. Article 9 (2010); Robert Willig, Unilateral Competitive Effects of
Mergers: Upward Pricing Pressure, Product Quality, and Other Extensions, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 19
(2011).
100. See e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARv. L. REv. 437 (2010).
101. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 97, § 6.1.
102. United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2011).
103. D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law,
64 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 45, 51 (2011); Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of
Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 781, 798-802 (2006).
104. Carstensen, supra note 21; Sokol, supra note 7.
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contemporary strategic use of litigation. 05
A number of hearings in recent years have addressed various costs of
antitrust and their impact on dominant firms. For example, the Department
of Justice's Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission held
hearings on Single Firm Conduct in 2006.106 A congressionally created
Antitrust Modernization Commission released a report on the future of
antitrust in 2007.107 In Febrtiary 2008, the Federal Trade Commission
organized a workshop to evaluate the welfare effects of unilateral effects
analysis,' 08 while the Department of Justice authored a report on Section 2
of the Sherman Act (since withdrawn).109 Across the Atlantic, the European
Commission released a White Paper in 2008110 on the feasibility of private
rights of action for antitrust in the European Union and a 2010 paper on
Collective Redress."'
The Standard Oil case stands for the greatest victory of the U.S.
government in a monopolization case. Legal battles, whether via public or
private enforcement, are costly. The alternative may be costly as well. In
Antitrust and Business History, Margaret Levenstein reviewed the recent
concentration trend in the United States and summarized: "Large
businesses require a large state, a state capacity that we are not willing to
create. But there is an alternative, and that is effective antitrust policy
which is empowered to promote competitive markets."" 2
C. MERGERS
Before the Sherman Act was enacted, Standard Oil acquired its
105. Sokol, supra note 7.
106. Notice of Public Hearings and Opportunity for Comment: Consumer Benefits and Harms:
How Best to Distinguish Aggressive, Pro-Consumer Competition from Business Conduct to Attain or
Maintain a Monopoly, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,872 (Apr. 7, 2006).
107. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 189-90 (2007),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report recommendation/amc final_report.pdf.
108. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases Agenda for Public Workshop on
Unilateral Effects Analysis and Litigation (Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opal
2008/02/uea.shtm.
109. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/
236681.pdf.
110. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the
EC Antitrust Rules, at 3, 10, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-COM:2008:0165:FIN:EN:PDF.
111. Eur. Comm'n, Commission Staff Working Document, Public Consultation: Towards a
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 final (Feb. 4, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consultingpublic/0054/sec2011 173_en.pdf.
112. Levenstein, supra note 30, at 457.
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competitors, threatening to drive them out of business. In Standard Oil and
U.S. Steel, Bill Page examines how the Supreme Court addressed the rise of
the next giant that supposedly employed similar strategies: U.S. Steel."'
Merger control in the United States owes its existence in part to
Standard Oil. While the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, the Clayton
Act, which governs mergers, was not enacted until 1914 (and initially for
only stock acquisitions),114 and a systematic premerger notification regime
was not adopted until 1976.115 The origins of the Clayton Act were a
function of debate in the 1912 presidential race and the sense that the
antitrust laws needed to be strengthened in light of the conduct of Standard
Oil and other firms. Had a merger regime been in place when Standard Oil
was making its acquisitions, Standard Oil would most likely not have been
able to achieve the monopolization it did.
Merger control remains a very important part of antitrust. Today, by
volume, most antitrust resources are dedicated to merger control.
Competition-directed merger control under antitrust law is generally
intended to prevent the formation of combined entities that could use their
market power-unilaterally or jointly with other firms-to charge prices
above the competitive level. The use of merger control is a more regulatory
form of antitrust than conduct cases, but offers certain advantages.
Particularly, merger control tools can be refined to the specifics of mergers
better than other antitrust tools such as collusion or dominance provisions.
It is often easier, for example, to address the issue of dominant firms ex
ante with merger law than ex post with monopolization law.'16 Antitrust
history provides some examples of the problems of anticompetitive
mergers and their economic impact. As Page documents, the mergers that
created U.S. Steel and Standard Oil are often viewed as having had a
significant negative effect on U.S. consumers." 7 Indeed, emerging
empirical scholarship on the merger wave of the 1890s suggests a
revisionist interpretation to its welfare impact-these mergers hurt
economic development." 8 The current economics of merger control are
113. Page, supra note 27.
114. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95
IOWA L. REv. 863, 879-80 (2010).
115. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a).
116. Levenstein, supra note 30.
117. Page, supra note 27; Granitz & Klein, supra note 19; Klein, supra note 19; Donald 0.
Parsons & Edward John Ray, The United States Steel Consolidation: The Creation of Market Control,
18 J.L. & ECON. 181 (1975).
I18. See, e.g., Levenstein, supra note 30.
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mixed with regard to the impact of concentration on social welfare.119
A merger control statute is often not sufficient for effective merger
control. One of the core developments in merger control in many
jurisdictions has been the development of merger guidelines. Transparent
guidelines present core concepts and explain how both legal and economic
analytics are applied to these concepts. When successful, guidelines also
provide merging parties with some predictability as to how an agency may
respond to their proposed merger.120
Over time, antitrust authorities have moved to a more economic based
approach in their merger analysis. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have
evolved along with economic thinking, having been created in 1968, and
revised in 1982, 1984, 1992, 1997, and again in 2010.121 European merger
law also has gone through increased economic rigor as a result of its 2004
reform, case law developments, and the creation of the chief economist
position at the Directorate General for Competition.122 Developments in the
application of the economics embodied in the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines will provide quite a bit of "antitrust energy" for scholarship.123
The changes in merger control in the United States and Europe impact
merger control globally. After a period of divergence as to economic
analysis of important cases across the Atlantic,124 there has been
convergence of the major antitrust merger regimes in recent years.125 Given
the importance of the European and U.S. merger control regimes, anecdotal
119. Jonathan B. Baker, Responding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the
Merger Guidelines, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 191-93 (2003).
120. William Blumenthal, Clear Agency Guidelines: Lessons from 1982, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 5
(2000).
121. D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055,
1105-09 (2010).
122. ULRICH SCHWALBE & DANIEL ZIMMER, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPEAN MERGER
CONTROL (2009); Tomaso Duso, Klaus Guglery, & Florian SzOcs, An Empirical Assessment of the 2004
EU Merger Policy Reform (Governance and the Efficiency of Econ. Sys., Discussion Paper No. 337,
2010).
123. See e.g., Roger Blair & Jessica Haynes, The Efficiencies Defense in the 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57 (2011); Michael A. Salinger, The 2010 Revised Merger
Guidelines and Modem Industrial Economics, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 159 (2011).
124. William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and
International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001); Jeremy Grant & Damien J. Neven,
The Attempted Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell: A Case Study of Transatlantic
Conflict, I J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 595 (2005).
125. Florian Szuics, Investigating Transatlantic Merger Policy Convergence (Vienna Univ. of
Econ. and Bus. Admin., Working Paper, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1773774; Mats A.
Bergman et al., Merger Control in the European Union and the United States: Just the Facts (Working
Paper, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-l56502 6 .
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evidence (though not tested empirically) suggests a similar convergence of
both developed and developing world merger control regimes as to
substance ("best practices") over time. The convergence is reinforced by
numerous factors-capacity building and technical assistance by the United
States and European Commission, other agencies, and other technical
assistance providers; imitation by younger antitrust regimes; advanced
degrees from Europe and the United States in both competition law and
economics; secondment in agencies and law firms in major jurisdictions;
and recommendations of soft law antitrust organizations. 126 Also relevant
have been advances in antitrust merger economics such as the increased use
of models for unilateral effects,127  coordinated effects, 128  merger
simulation, 129 efficiencies,130 and upward pricing pressure.131
Supranational solutions to merger control (other than at the European-
wide level) have not been adopted to any measurable effect. Their absence
largely reflects the lack of any effective international merger review
institution. An obvious contender for such an institution, the World Trade
Organization, lacks the substantive knowledge of antitrust as well as the
legitimacy to undertake such review. 132 In no region other than Europe
have regional merger institutions been effectively implemented, although
the potential for effective regional merger control includes a reduction in
resource and capability constraints.133 Thus, for the majority of the world,
merger review remains a national rather than regional or global endeavor.
126. See e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, The Development of Human Capital in Latin American
Competition Policy, in LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (Eleanor M. Fox & D.
Daniel Sokol eds., 2009).
127. Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects ofHorizontal Mergers,
in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008); Jonathan B. Baker & David
Reitman, Research Topics in Unilateral Effects Analysis (Am. Univ., WCL Research Paper No. 09-37,
2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/.
128. Janusz A. Ordover, Coordinated Effects, in I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1359 (Wayne Dale Collins ed., 2008).
129. Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New
Applications, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 883 (2001); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Simulation as an
Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries, in THE ECONOMICS OF
THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 65 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996).
130. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review ofHorizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207 (2003); Johan N.M.
Lagerl6f & Paul Heidhues, On the Desirability ofan Efficiency Defense in Merger Control, 23 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 803 (2005).
131. Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 99, at 1, 18.
132. D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International
Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37, 91-92 (2007).
133. Michal Gal & Inbal Faibish Wassmer, Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions:
Unleashing the Potential, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (Mor Bakhoum et al. eds., forthcoming, Edward Elgar, 2012).
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Given the lack of supranational protections, merger control may be
necessary even for developing economies when other jurisdictions cannot
remedy the conduct that will have country-specific effects, when there is
sufficient nexus to the transaction, and when economic analysis is
sufficiently sound to avert most false positives. Antitrust matters more now
because countries regularly use competition and the market where the
market did not exist before. The legal framework has also impacted the
study of mergers as well as the practice of mergers. 134
Yet, at what point in the development of a nation's competition
regime should the law be expanded to include merger control? The
preconditions seem to include (1) that there are enough resources within an
agency, (2) that the agency has enough experience with the easier issues of
competition law, such as hard core cartel enforcement, and (3) that there
has been consolidation via merger with unilateral or coordinated conduct
infractions that ex post competition enforcement has been unable to
remedy.
D. REMEDIES
Standard Oil stands for the most dramatic remedy in antitrust:
dissolution. Remedies vary in antitrust. Peter Carstensen examines the
available remedies for monopolization and changing approaches toward
such remedies.135 The goal of structural remedies is to restore the
competition that would have existed but for the monopolization. This was
the remedy that was put into place in the Standard Oil context. Such
remedies may create a new source of competition through divestiture or
strengthen an existing competitor who purchases the divested asset(s).136
Overall, most jurisdictions around the world prefer the use of structural
remedies, at least for horizontal mergers.137 In the conduct context,
structural remedies, as Carstensen notes, are rare.' 38
134. Liran Einav & Jonathan D. Levin, Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report, 24
J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 152 (2010). ("Thirty years ago, it was common for antitrust arguments to rest on
simple summary measures of industry structure such as concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman
indices. Nowadays, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which are tasked
with reviewing proposed mergers, commonly undertake sophisticated econometric studies to define
industry boundaries and to assess the likelihood of price increases or collusive behavior following a
merger. These exercises often draw on academic research, and in turn have motivated the development
of new empirical models.").
135. Carstensen, supra note 21.
136. U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES (2011).
137. INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, MERGER REMEDIES REVIEW PROJECT (2005), available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.orguploads/library/doc323.pdf
138. Carstensen, supra note 21.
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IV. CONCLUSION
One hundred years after the Supreme Court delivered its decision in
Standard Oil, the case still introduces nuances to the discipline and fuels
debates. Antitrust history and the present are rich with many other
significant and important judicial decisions and developments. Contrary to
some rumors, the field has never lacked energy.
Standard Oil is today's ExxonMobil-the second largest corporation
in the United States these days. On the one hundredth anniversary of
Standard Oil, ExxonMobil was the largest corporation and lost its position
to Apple only a few months later. One may argue that Standard Oil made
no difference, since the octopus regrouped; Standard Oil is still with us.
Studying the history of antitrust in the petroleum industry, Timothy Muris
and Bilal Sayyed explain the rationale for the competition policy in the
industry and show that, unlike Standard, ExxonMobil faces competition.' 39
Some debates regarding Standard Oil will probably never be settled.
The economics of the rebates and drawbacks Standard Oil received from
railroads is an example of one of these debates. Dan Crane explores
whether they were cost justified and concludes that "there is little or no
evidence that the rebates were proportional to the magnitude of the
savings." 4 0 The riddle of how John D. Rockefeller acquired power and
made Standard Oil a formidable monopoly is still debated. In 1996,
Benjamin Klein and Elizabeth Granitz introduced the most comprehensive
explanation thus far: Standard Oil stabilized the cartel among the railroads
and used this position to raise its rivals' costs.14 1 For this tribute to the
centennial anniversary of Standard Oil, Klein further elaborates his classic
explanation.142 As Standard Oil demands, Klein's classic explanation is
contested. George Priest argues that the facts do not support the raising
rivals' theory; Rockefeller, he argues bought up his competitors in a merger
to monopoly that years later became illegal under antitrust law.' 43
Overall, the opportunity to reflect upon one hundred years of Standard
Oil provides a window into the past, present and future of antitrust law
scholarship. This scholarship has had a significant impact upon the analysis
139. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 32.
140. Crane, supra note 19, at 560.
141. Granitz & Klein, supra note 19.
142. Klein, supra note 19.
143. Priest, supra note 19.
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of law overall, as a vanguard of the law and economics movement.
Antitrust legal scholarship will continue to provide insights not merely
within antitrust but more generally within law, such as the analysis of
contractual relations, the interplay of standards versus rules, private versus
public enforcement, common law versus administrative law, and
globalization of law, mergers, and remedies.
